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Abstract: Software Architectural Assessment is a 
key discipline to identify at early stages of a real-time 
system (RTS) synthesis the problems that may 
become critical in its operation. Typical mechanisms 
supporting concurrency, such as semaphores or 
monitors, usually lead to concurrency problems in 
execution time difficult to identify, reproduce and 
solve. For this reason it is crucial to understand the 
root causes of these problems and to provide 
support to identify and mitigate them at early stages 
of the system lifecycle. This paper aims to present 
the results of a research work oriented to the 
creation of a tool to assess deadlock risk in 
architectural models of a RTS. A concrete 
architectural style (PPOOA-UML) was used to 
represent PIM (Platform Independent Models) of a 
RTS architecture supported by the PPOOA-Visio 
CASE tool. A case study was used to validate the 
deadlock assessment tool created. In the context of 
one of the functions of a military transport aircraft, 
the auto-tuning function of the communications 
system was selected for the assessment of the 
deadlock risk. According to the results obtained 
some guidelines are outlined to minimize the 
deadlock risk of the system architecture. 
Keywords: Software Architecture, Real-Time, UML, 
Concurrency, Deadlock. 
1. Introduction 
Software architecture modeling is a relevant subject 
for the production of real-time systems. The 
development of architectural analysis and design 
languages in the last years has permitted to 
represent both structure and behavior of such 
systems with less consideration to implementation 
details. 
In this context, an architectural style is a consistent 
set of building elements with architecting rules for 
using these building elements to create system 
models. The style well-formedness rules assure a 
minimum consistency level. Nevertheless, in addition 
to the notational or syntactic capabilities of a style, 
process and guidelines are also needed to help 
software architects to produce feasible models 
concerning particular characteristics (e.g. safety). 
PPOOA architectural style [9] has been selected 
because it combines both UML notation and MDE 
concerns, allowing software structural analysis. In 
addition this style is particularly useful to explicitly 
represent concurrency issues. 
Deadlock is far from being a solved problem. It is in 
fact an open issue for many research and technical 
works [2][4][16] and of high interest for industry 
especially in the real-time embedded domain. Over 
the last three decades different formal methods have 
been developed to specify and verify system 
properties. In this context, Model Checking [5] has 
become a reference discipline for such approach. Its 
main goal is to build a finite model (Kripke structure) 
of a system and check that relevant properties are 
present in it. What is remarkable from this approach 
is that an exhaustive search of the state space is 
performed in order to ensure the property fulfilment. 
One of the properties particularly checked through 
model checking techniques applied to concurrent 
systems is deadlock absence [2][4]. Although the 
main criticism to this approach is the classical state 
explosion of the models involved, from a practitioner 
point of view the main drawbacks are the intrinsic 
complexity of the modelling techniques and their 
scalability to large RTS in industrial environments. 
Industrial applications require simple and practical 
approaches to be easily adopted. 
In addition to deadlock detection and prevention, the 
third traditional strategy is deadlock avoidance. 
Under this category falls a successful mechanism 
that provides deadlock-freedom. The set of resource 
access protocols known as priority inheritance [14] 
has as major objective the resolution of priority 
inversion. As a collateral benefit deadlock is also 
avoided if priority ceiling (PCP) or highest locker 
(HLP) protocols are present in the RTOS. The main 
issue with this mechanism is that very few 
commercial RTOS support these protocols and their 
ad-hoc implementation is complex and therefore 
onerous. Furthermore some authors have reported 
performance overheads derived from the utilization 
of these protocols [3]. 
This paper proposes the implementation of graph 
theory to characterize the deadlock risk of an 
architectural model of a RTS. The objective is not to 
avoid or detect deadlock occurrence or to prove that 
a design is deadlock-free, but to assess the risk of 
deadlock present in an architectural model. It is 
assumed that a model has an intrinsic risk of 
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deadlock which may condition further design 
decisions. The idea with this approach is to make 
designers aware about this risk as soon as possible 
and with the minimum analysis effort required. The 
kind of model verification proposed in this paper is 
static analysis of platform independent models (see 
Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1: MDA Context 
We propose a new control-flow complexity metric 
based on the properties of the architectural models 
of a RTS. The information considered in the 
characterization of deadlock risk comes from the 
following sources: cyclic complexity of the model and 
structural and dynamic deadlock patterns. Although 
the technique proposed is applicable to any kind of 
system, deadlock topic is of special interest in RT 
domain. 
Although many CASE tools exist in the market to 
support the software design activities, most of them 
focus only on the notational aspects with very little 
concern on engineering activities (e.g. alternative 
design tradeoffs). Several commercial tools [1][11] 
support real-time characteristics, but with no specific 
feature to analyze concurrency problems. Static 
analysis tools [7] partially cover this topic but their 
main purpose is to analyse the quality of the 
software source code (not the models). Finally 
model-checking tools [2] require the usage of 
detailed models with formal notations. A clear gap 
has been identified in current modelling tools to 
support the concurrency problem assessment at 
high level of abstraction with semiformal notations 
(i.e. UML). 
In section 2 we briefly describe the PPOOA-UML 
style fundamentals to better understand the 
examples of models used later. The proposed 
characterization of deadlock is presented in section 
3. The tool created to automate this assessment is 
outlined in section 4. And finally sections 5, 6 and 7 
discuss about a case study and the alternative 
design proposed according to the results from the 
assessment to the concrete RTS model example. 
2. PPOOA Architectural Style 
A software architectural style encapsulates decisions 
about its building elements and emphasizes 
important constraints on the elements and their 
relations. The PPOOA (Pipelines of Processes in 
Object Oriented Architectures) architectural style 
provides building elements for RTS such as 
components and coordination mechanisms [9]. 
Constraints on building elements are represented in 
the PPOOA metamodel and by explicit guidelines. 
These guidelines not only represent the semantics of 
the style, they are also helpful for the software 
architect using the style. 
The UML stereotypes are extended with the 
elements of the PPOOA style (periodic and aperiodic 
processes, controller objects, and coordination 
mechanisms). UML Activity diagrams are also 
adapted for PPOOA style requirements, specifically 
modelling system responses [8]. 
The PPOOA architecture diagram is used instead of 
the UML component diagram to describe the 
structural view of the RTS architecture. Coordination 
mechanisms, used as connectors, are also 
represented in the architecture diagram. 
The RTS behaviour view is supported by the "Causal 
Flow of Activities (CFA)" representation. A CFA 
represents a behavioural view of the flow of activities 
performed by the system in response to an event. 
PPOOA uses the UML activity diagram with 
partitions to support allocation of activities to the 
architecture component instances performing them. 
For the purposes of this paper, these are the 
relevant abstractions used in PPOOA for explicit 
concurrency modelling: 
 Task: PPOOA building element representing 
threads or light processes. It may be periodic or 
aperiodic. 
 Resource: Logical resources can be represented 
in PPOOA by Domain Components or 
Structures. These building elements are 
abstractions of design classes and abstract data 
types respectively. 
 Semaphore: A pure synchronization mechanism. 
It is the PPOOA building element that supports 
the synchronization of tasks. Semaphores are 
used to protect shared logical resources. 
 Bounded Buffer: A coordination mechanism 
representing a FIFO queue used to 
communicate asynchronously two tasks. 
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3. Deadlock Characterization  
According to Coffman [6], the four necessary and 
sufficient conditions for deadlock are: Mutual 
Exclusion, Hold and Wait, Non Pre-emption and 
Circular Wait. 
Circular waiting depends essentially on the tasks 
interdependency. Tasks must be in a dependency 
cycle to have a circular waiting. Hold and wait 
condition depends on the coordination protocol as it 
describes the way tasks are permitted to access 
resources. Non-preemption and mutual exclusion 
conditions may depend on resources constraints and 
coordination protocols. 
In order to highlight the way deadlock is 
characterized in PPOOA, a theoretical example is 
used to represent the structural model of a generic 
system. In Fig. 2, tasks are represented by 
architectural elements of the type “Process” and 
resources in the diagram are represented by 
“Structure” elements of PPOOA style. In this 
example, the resources are protected by PPOOA 
semaphores (coordination mechanisms in the style) 
to guarantee mutual exclusion. This protection 
involves the first condition for deadlock (mutual 
exclusion). 
 
Figure 2. Potential deadlock in the PPOOA 
architectural view. 
Circular waiting condition is represented in the 
PPOOA architectural view by a dependency cycle. In 
this case, tasks D, E and G conform a cycle. The 
rest of tasks in the diagram do not involve any cycle 
and therefore they cannot contribute to deadlock 
risk. Non-preemption condition is implicit in the 
semaphore coordination protocol and cannot be 
represented diagrammatically. 
From the circular waiting condition a first criterion for 
the characterization of deadlock risk can be 
extracted: identify all dependency cycles where two 
or more tasks are involved in an architectural model. 
The reason why two or more tasks are required is 
that at least two active elements must be competing 
for shared resources in a dependency cycle. The 
higher the cyclic complexity of model, the higher its 
deadlock risk. 
 Cyclic dependency of several tasks is necessary but 
not sufficient for deadlock. For the purposes of this 
paper the rest of conditions shall be summarised as 
follows: the tasks involved in a dependency cycle 
must be waiting for conditions depending on other 
tasks in the same dependency cycle. 
The approach proposed in this paper is to refine the 
cyclic complexity with additional criteria from the 
structural and behavioural views of an architectural 
model. This refinement strategy is based on the 
identification of structural and behavioural deadlock 
patterns within the dependency cycles identified in 
the model. Deadlock risk is broken down into two 
factors: structural or intrinsic deadlock risk, and 
behavioural or dynamic deadlock risk. 
For the structural part of the deadlock risk, four 
deadlock patterns are proposed, considering the 
type of constructive elements and the dependency 
relationships with others in the dependency cycles.  
The first structural deadlock pattern (Fig. 3.a) 
considered in this characterization involves two (or 
more) tasks and two (or more) resources protected 
with respective semaphores in the same 
dependency cycle. This is the classical deadlock 
case where several tasks are waiting for each other 
to use locked resources. 
 
 
(a) Protected Resources Pattern (b) Buffers Pattern 
 
 
(c) Synchronous Communication 
Pattern 
(d) Buffer-Semaphore Pattern 
Figure 3. Structural Deadlock Patterns. 
According to Sutter [16], protected resources are not 
the only architectural elements susceptible to cause 
waiting of tasks. Buffers can also introduce some 
risk of waiting when a task accesses them for some 
data and they are occasionally empty or full. For this 
reason buffers can also be considered as risky 
elements with respect to deadlock. The second 
structural pattern (Fig. 3.b) involves two (or more 
tasks) and two (or more) buffers in the same 
dependency cycle. 
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Synchronous message communication can be 
represented using a combination of a buffer of 
capacity one and a binary semaphore [10]. This 
inter-task communication pattern involves task 
waiting: the producer task waits until the consumer 
task acknowledges message reception. Therefore it 
can also be considered risky for deadlock. The third 
structural pattern (Fig. 3.c) involves two (or more) 
tasks and one buffer and one semaphore (not 
protecting resources) in the same dependency cycle. 
Finally, for consistency with the two first patterns, a 
fourth pattern shall be considered (Fig. 3.d): two (or 
more) tasks, one (or more) buffer and one (or more) 
semaphore protecting resources in the same 
dependency cycle. 
Each time one of these patterns is found in a 
dependency cycle, the tool records the architectural 
elements involved and marks them as risky elements 
from the structural point of view. The dependency 
cycle where they participate is considered therefore 
as risky from the structural perspective. The Static 
Deadlock Risk is defined in this characterization as 
the total number of risky dependency cycles present 
in the architectural model. 
For the behavioural or dynamic part of deadlock risk, 
four additional sequence patterns are considered in 
the behavioural diagrams of the architectural style.  
The first pattern (Fig. 4.a) represents the separation 
of control flow in a CFA. This pattern involves 
execution parallelism of activities and therefore can 
be considered risky for deadlock. 
 
(a) Flow Separation Pattern 
 
(b) Task-Semaphore-Resource Pattern 
 
(c) Task-Buffer Pattern 
 
(d) Task-Buffer-Semaphore Pattern 
Figure 3.  Behavioural Deadlock Patterns. 
The second pattern (Fig. 4.b) is represented by the 
sequence Task-Semaphore-Resource in a CFA. 
This pattern is the behavioural counterparty of the 
first structural pattern. The third behavioural pattern 
(Fig. 4.c) corresponds to the second structural 
pattern and the fourth (Fig. 4.d) corresponds to the 
third structural pattern. The fourth structural pattern 
has no specific behavioural counterparty because it 
is in fact considered in the second and third patterns. 
Each time one of these sequences is found in a CFA 
diagram, the tool records the architectural elements 
involved and checks if they are included in the list of 
risky elements from the static point of view. In 
positive case the dependency cycle where they 
participate is considered therefore as risky from the 
behavioural perspective. 
The overall deadlock risk is characterized by the 
total number of dependency cycles containing both 
structural and behavioural deadlock patterns. The 
interpretation of these parameters is the following: 
whenever the architectural model of a system has a 
dependency cycle, there is potential risk of deadlock. 
This risk is confirmed when those dependency 
cycles contain structural deadlock patterns. If they 
do not contain structural deadlock patterns, they can 
be considered as (conceptually) deadlock-free, with 
the information available at this stage. Finally the risk 
is refined with behavioural deadlock patterns. 
Nevertheless, the absence of behavioural patterns 
does not guarantee deadlock absence, because this 
view can be lacking information of the implemented 
architecture (e.g. sometimes designers consider 
implicit the participation of semaphores in the access 
protocol to a protected resource described in a 
CFA). As a summary, for the purposes of this paper 
the most relevant evidence of deadlock risk is the 
existence of dependency cycles containing structural 
deadlock patterns in structural diagrams. If no risky 
cycle exists, no deadlock may occur. The 
characterization proposes a refinement of this 
parameter based on the sequence information 
available in the behavioural view. 
4. Automatic Deadlock Risk Assessment 
The algorithm outline proposed to assess deadlock 
risk in this paper is as follows: 
1. Find all dependency cycles in architectural 
diagrams where two or more tasks are involved. 
2. Search all the structural patterns present in the 
risky cycles previously identified. 
3. Mark all the building elements involved in risky 
cycles with structural patterns as risky elements. 
4. Assign a numeric value to the intrinsic deadlock 
risk: the amount of risky cycles containing structural 
patterns. 
5. Search all the behavioural patterns present in the 
CFAs where the risky elements participate. 
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6. Assign a numeric value to the behavioural 
deadlock risk: the amount of risky cycles containing 
behavioural patterns. 
The first step of this algorithm was implemented 
through the particularization of a cycle detection 
algorithm applicable to undirected graphs with a 
depth first search strategy. More details about this 
algorithm were presented in a previous paper [12]. 
The results from the cycle detection tool are: 
 List of cycle sequences 
 List of elements involved in the cycles 
Once the cycles are identified, the tool takes into 
account two additional contributions to deadlock risk: 
structural patterns and behavioural patterns. The 
structural patterns described in previous section are 
searched in all the dependency cycles. Once a 
structural pattern is identified the cycle is marked as 
risky as well as all the elements participating in the 
pattern. For the behavioural part, all the CFAs are 
scanned to search each of the patterns identified. 
This time only those elements considered risky from 
the structural point of view are considered in the 
search. Each time a behavioural pattern is found the 
corresponding CFA is marked as risky. The tool 
takes into account for the overall behavioural 
deadlock risk if the elements participating in a risky 
cycle also participate in a behavioural pattern. In this 
case the cycle is also marked as risky from the 
behavioural point of view. 
We used PPOOA-Visio tool [13], which is currently 
supported on the top of Microsoft-Visio®. This tool is 
flexible enough to extend its functionality to support 
additional engineering features to assess the 
concurrency problem identified in this paper. The 
strategy selected was to use an XML export add-on 
to generate an intermediate file containing the 
dependencies and additional information necessary 
for the tools to assess the models. This tool is 
conceived to help system architects to assess the 
deadlock reliability of their designs. But perhaps the 
most important aspect is that it enables them to 
compare the relative deadlock risk of several design 
alternatives, in order to better make and justify 
formal architectural decisions. 
5. Case Study Description 
A case study in the field of military avionics is 
presented here to illustrate the applicability of the 
proposed deadlock analysis and to validate the 
assessment tool. 
One of the functions provided by the avionics 
embedded in military aircrafts is the automatic 
communications management. In particular, the 
function known as “Automatic Tuning of 
Communication Equipments” (a.k.a. Autotuning) was 
selected to illustrate the approach of this paper. This 
function is in charge of setting the frequencies of all 
on-board communication equipments (mainly radios 
and transceivers) in order to avoid unauthorized 
interception of communications by the enemy. 
 
Figure 5. Autotuning Plan Subsystem. 
The architectural model for this function was broken 
down into three subsystems: Autotuning Plan (Fig. 
5), Tuning Configuration (Fig. 6) and Autotuning 
Views Management. This third subsystem was not 
relevant for this paper. 
The Autotuning Plan subsystem captures time, 
aircraft position and waypoint information from the 
avionics bus, represented in the architecture by the 
buffers B2, B3 and B4 respectively. Tasks T2, T4 
and T5 are in charge to update these data in the 
buffer B1. The periodic process T1 (Management 
Autotuning Plan) is the main task of this subsystem 
and implements the execution of the autotuning 
plan. This task browses the list of planned events, 
implemented by resource R1, and compares them 
with the queue of events captured in real-time in the 
buffer B1. It is important to remark that B1 is 
combined with the binary semaphore S3 
(synchronous communication pattern) to ensure that 
all the messages from the event handlers are 
received by the plan manager T1. 
 
Figure 6. Tuning Configuration Subsystem. 
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The tasks T1 and T3 can concurrently write on the 
shared resource R1. In terms of problem domain, the 
pilot and the planning process can update the 
autotuning plan. For this reason this resource is 
protected with another semaphore (S2). 
Whenever the planning process T1 detects that a 
condition takes place, as the result of the periodic 
comparison, it pushes a new triggering event in the 
stack R3, which represents the command for the 
second subsystem to reconfigure the communication 
equipments tuning. 
The aperiodic task T7 captures the event from the 
protected stack R3 and the controller element 
Autotuning Configuration sends the command to set 
new tuning configuration to the communication 
equipments, represented in the diagram by 
resources R5, R6, R7 and R8. The process T8 
detects conflicts in the configurations of different 
communication equipments and sends the warning 
messages through the corresponding bus ports 
represented by the buffer elements B6 and B7. 
This architecture was selected to illustrate the 
handling of shared resources (it allows parallel 
execution of tasks), but has some concurrency 
problems that shall be highlighted in the following 
section. 
The behavioural part of the model is partially 
represented by the CFA “Triggered Event” (see Fig. 
7). This CFA can be interpreted as follows: at the 
arrival of the internal event “New conditions” the 
sequence of activities triggered within the system is: 
1. T1 (autotuning plan manager) gets new conditions 
from B1.  
2. As long as B1 is protected by S3, before 
accessing the buffer, the semaphore must be 
acquired first. In execution time T1 may be forced to 
remain waiting for the semaphore to be released. 
3. Once the buffer is available the message is 
received by T1. 
4. After that the semaphore is released and the list of 
events opened for reading the next event in it. This 
list is protected by semaphore S2, and thus T1 can 
remain waiting until release. 
5. T1 compares the information captured from B1 
with the one in the list, transformed by the 
comparison algorithm R4, and if the result is positive 
the event in the list is flagged and the command for 
the communication equipments reconfiguration is 
sent through the intermediate stack R3 (protected by 
the semaphore S1). 
6. Otherwise the next element in the list R1 is 
analyzed until list end.  
6. Results Discussion 
The tool transforms the architectural diagrams 
described in previous section into the aggregated 
graph shown in Figure 8. This undirected graph 
represents all the elements of the architecture and 
the relations among them (regardless their type).  
Figure 7. CFA Triggered event. 
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Figure 8. Structural Graph. 
This graph is used as input by the cycle identification 
tool as a first step of the deadlock characterization. 
The results from this tool are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. List of dependency cycles detected. 
Cycle Elements 
Deadlock 
Risk? 
1 
PP_Manager_Autotuning_Plan, 
Semaphore 3, PP_Update_A/C_Position, 
B_New_Conditions 
Yes 
2 
AP_Update_Waypoint_Passed, 
Semaphore 3, PP_Update_A/C_Position, 
B_New_Conditions 
Yes 
3 
PP_Manager_Autotuning_Plan, 
Semaphore 3, 
AP_Update_Waypoint_Passed, 
B_New_Conditions 
Yes 
4 
AP_Update_Waypoint_Passed, 
Semaphore 3, PP_Update_Time, 
B_New_Conditions 
Yes 
5 
PP_Manager_Autotuning_Plan, 
Semaphore 3, PP_Update_Time, 
B_New_Conditions 
Yes 
6 
PP_Update_A/C_Position, Semaphore 3, 
PP_Update_Time, B_New_Conditions 
Yes 
7 
Conditions_Checker, 
PP_Manager_Autotuning_Plan  
No 
8 
AP_Capture_Triggered_Event, 
B_Tuning_Configuration, 
AP_Detect_Conflicts, 
CT_Autotuning_Configuration 
No 
 
According to this list, 8 dependency cycles were 
detected. Out of them only 6 dependency cycles 
contain two or more tasks with structural deadlock 
patterns. Therefore the Structural Deadlock Risk 
(SDR) of this model is 6. 
In Figure 8 the elements participating in the 
structural deadlock patterns are shown in circles. 
These elements shall be considered risky for 
deadlock. The risky elements detected are: 
 Tasks:  
o PP_Manager_Autotuning_Plan (T1) 
o PP_Update_A/C_Position (T4) 
o AP_Update_Waypoint_Passed (T2) 
o PP_Update_Time (T5) 
 Buffers: B_New_Conditions (B1) 
 Semaphores: Semaphore 3 (S3) 
Once the information from structural diagrams is 
used, the rest of information relevant for the 
deadlock analysis comes from the CFAs. In this case 
study, only three out of seven CFAs included risky 
elements. The information generated by the tool is 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. List of behavioural patterns detected. 
# Task-Semaphore-Buffer T-B 
T-S-
R 
Separa
tion  
1 
Analyse 
waypoint(AP_Update_Waypoint_Pass
ed) -> Acquire(Semaphore 3) -> Send 
new condition(B_New_Conditions) 
None None 0 
2 
Analyse time(PP_Update_Time) -> 
Acquire(Semaphore 3) -> Send 
time(B_New_Conditions) 
Analyse 
position(PP_Update_A/C_Position) -> 
Acquire(Semaphore 3) -> Send 
position(B_New_Conditions) 
None None 1 
4 
Request new 
conds(PP_Manager_Autotuning_Plan) 
-> Acquire(Semaphore 3) -> 
Receive(B_New_Conditions) 
None None 0 
 
From this information the following conclusions can 
be extracted: 
 All the risky elements participate in the risky 
CFAs 1, 2 and 4. 
 All the risky elements participate in at least one 
behavioural pattern in some risky CFA. 
 All the cycles considered risky from the 
structural point of view are therefore also risky 
from the behavioural perspective. The Dynamic 
Deadlock Risk (DDR) of this model is 6. 
As a final summary the Table 3 shows the risky 
elements and the cycles and CFAs where they 
participate.  
7. Alternative Design Discussion and Validation 
From the results of previous section the following 
conclusions can be extracted: 
 The elements B_New_Conditions (B1) and 
Semaphore 3 (S3) are the most conflictive as 
long as both participate in all risky cycles and 
CFAs (see Table 3). 
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 The rest of risky elements participate each in 
three dependency cycles and one CFA, but all 
related with the same pattern. 
 The elements B1 and S3 are part of the 
synchronous communication pattern, required to 
ensure that all the messages sent by the tasks 
T2, T4 and T5 are received by the plan manager 
task T1. This pattern is in fact the only source of 
deadlock risk identified in this case study. 
A simple way to reduce the deadlock risk can be to 
change the current communication pattern among 
these tasks to an asynchronous pattern. This pattern 
involves removing the semaphore S3. The resulting 
model has no risky elements as the semaphore 
causing the risk is missing. Nevertheless, this design 
decision is in conflict with the real-time requirement 
of ensuring that no message from the event 
managers is lost. For this reason this alternative was 
discarded.  
A second alternative design was proposed in order 
to fulfil with both requirements: low deadlock risk and 
reliable message handling. The change consists in 
splitting the current buffer B_New_Conditions into 
three buffers each communicating the pairs of tasks: 
T1-T2, T1-T4 and T1-T5. The results from the 
deadlock assessment tool show that no risk is 
present in this alternative model. Further analysis 
can be performed with temporal data to assess tasks 
overload with complementary tools like Cheddar. 
The validation of the parameters proposed in this 
paper, as well as the results of the different case 
studies used to derive them were performed with the 
aid of the schedulability analysis and simulation tool 
Cheddar [15], developed in the University of Brest. 
Cheddar is interoperable with PPOOA-Visio [10]. A 
specific developed Visio add-on implements the 
interoperability between PPOOA-Visio and Cheddar, 
and allows capturing architecture model information 
generated with PPOOA as an XML file input for 
Cheddar. Execution times estimation was added to 
models in order to allow the simulation of execution 
in Cheddar showing when deadlock occurs. 
 
8. Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper proposes a complementary approach to 
the existing deadlock prevention, avoidance and 
detection techniques. The automated analysis of 
basic properties of an architectural model allows the 
characterization complex problems such as the 
overall deadlock risk of an RTS architecture with 
very few design information. The model information 
used in this characterization is: 
 Cyclic dependency of tasks and resources 
 Structural patterns in architectural diagrams 
 Behavioural patterns in activity diagrams 
The appropriate combination of these three sources 
provides factors (Structural Deadlock Risk and 
Behavioural Deadlock Risk), which can be used to 
compute the potential risk of a design to have 
deadlocks and in addition to compare alternative 
designs to choose the most appropriate with respect 
to deadlock.  
This analysis has been validated by the application 
of the tool created to a real case study in the field of 
military avionics, and the results of the case study 
were used to make design decisions on alternative 
designs more reliable concerning deadlock. 
Although the tool was created as an add-on on top 
of PPOOA-Visio, the analysis proposed in this paper 
can be extended to architectural designs created 
with any other architectural description language 
representing explicit concurrency. The conclusions 
obtained are of general applicability and were 
considered relevant in practice to make architectural 
decisions at early stages of the conception of an 
avionics system. 
The following steps of the research work shall be 
focused in the tuning of the tool with the information 
extracted from the application to other case study in 
the field of robotic space missions. The results of 
these research activities shall be the core of a 
doctoral thesis. The prototype of the deadlock risk 
assessment tool has been developed as part of an 
MsC thesis presented in 2009 in the Technical 
University of Madrid (UPM). 
ID Risky Element 1 2 3 4 5 6 CFA1 CFA2 CFA4
1 PP_Manager_Autotuning_Plan (T1) X X X X
2 PP_Update_A/C_Position (T4) X X X X
3 AP_Update_Waypoint_Passed (T2) X X X X
4 PP_Update_Time (T5) X X X X
5 B_New_Conditions (B1) X X X X X X X X X
6 Semaphore 3 (S3) X X X X X X X X X
Risky Cycles Risky CFAs
Table 3. List of risky elements and their participation in risky cycles and CFAs. 
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Finally it should be mentioned that the approach 
proposed in this paper can be considered as a 
partial view of a future architecture assessment tool. 
Additional concurrency and architectural problems in 
general (e.g. race conditions or low cohesion) could 
also be addressed with similar approaches. Ideally 
an engineering dashboard with different indicators of 
system properties could be created to support 
architectural decisions and trade-offs.  
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Glossary 
CASE:  Computer Aided Software Engineering 
CFA:  Causal Flow of Activities 
CPU:  Central Processing Unit 
HLP:  Highest Locker Protocol 
HMI:  Human Machine Interface 
MDE:  Model Driven Engineering 
PCP:  Priority Ceiling Protocol 
PPOOA: Pipelines of Processes in Object Oriented 
Architectures 
RMA:  Rate Monotonic Analysis 
RTOS:  Real-Time Operating System 
RTS:  Real-Time System 
UML:  Unified Modelling Language 
XML:  Extensible Mark-up Language 
 
